Co-operation in Health and Safety: A Game Theory
Analysis by Nadeau, Sylvie
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 1
Number 3 Pierce Law Review Article 7
May 2003
Co-operation in Health and Safety: A Game
Theory Analysis
Sylvie Nadeau
Department of Mechanical Engineering, École de Technologie Supérieure, Quebec, Canada
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the Occupational Health and Industrial Hygiene Commons, and the Risk Analysis
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Sylvie Nadeau, Co-operation in Health and Safety: A Game Theory Analysis, 1 Pierce L. Rev. 219 (2003), available at
http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol1/iss3/7
File: Nadeau  (Macro) Final #1 Created on: 7/20/2003 9:38 PM Last Printed: 8/7/2003 5:05 PM 
219 





Health and safety managers face complex challenges in today’s pro-
duction environments.  They are confronted with increasingly flexible, 
autonomous and polyvalent contexts.  Asymmetry of information on the 
workplace is widespread because various intervening parties rely on in-
formation lacking conformity.  Social partners generate and use informa-
tion which supports or benefits their pursuit of differing goals.  Ascertain-
ing and controlling this information can prove both difficult and costly.  
When addressing health and safety issues, one intervening partner alters or 
changes behavior in response to changes introduced by the other side.1  
Strategic behaviors result, based on post-contract opportunism (moral haz-
ard) and alliances with partners who can reasonably be expected to deliver 
predictable and effective contributions toward individual goals (adverse 
selection).  These behaviors arise out of diagnostic problems, difficulty in 
determining acceptable risk, asymmetries in the information used in risk 
taking decisions on the part of social partners and the operation of health 
and safety systems.2 
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 1. Marcel Simard & Alain Marchand. Workgroups’ Propensity to Comply With Safety Rules: The 
Influence of Micro-Macro Organisational Factors, 40 Ergonomics 172, 185 (1997). 
 
 2. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey,  
< http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/98s-04.pdf > 1-2 (accessed June 23, 2003). 
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Many studies show that intervening parties in health and safety are not 
economically passive.3  The health and safety system can become a work 
substitute.4  Other studies have found a correlation between reduced gener-
osity attributable to unemployment insurance and increases in the mean 
time of absenteeism compensated by the Health and Safety Commission of 
Quebec (C.S.S.T.:  Commission de la santé et de la sécurité au travail du 
Québec).5  These studies also found an association between reduced unem-
ployment allowances and a higher incidence of cases based on selective 
revelations or voluntary and planned manipulation of information.6  Other 
studies have found that injuries posing more difficult diagnosis than 
bruises and lacerations, for example, are most often reported on the first 
day following a holiday.7  Finally, some studies showed that the health and 
safety compensation system of the Health and Safety Commission of Que-
bec has had an effect on the nature of injuries reported.  Increases in the 
anticipated compensation generate higher incidence in non-related work 
injuries and injuries difficult to diagnose.8 
Many experts and managers have favored incentives promoting active 
worker participation to thwart such strategic behaviors, but these are diffi-
cult to design.9  Others have developed a risk management approach called 
participating ergonomics, where the intervention process is advisory, rep-
  
 3. James R. Chelius, The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety Incentives, 35 Indus.& 
Lab. Rel. Rev. 235, 236 (1982); John D. Worrall & David Appel, The Impact of Workers' Compensa-
tion Benefits on Low-back Claims, in Clinical Concepts in Regl. Musculoskeletal Illness 8 (Norton M. 
Hadler ed., Grune and Stratton 1987); Alan B. Krueger, Incentive Effects of Workers' Compen. Ins., 41 
J. Public Econ. 73, 74 (1990); Marian C. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Compen. Mechanisms for Job 
Risks:  Wages, Workers' Compensation, and Product Liability 228 (Princeton U. Press 1990); Richard 
J. Butler, Lost Injury Days: Moral Hazard Differences Between Tort and Workers' Compensation, 63 J. 
Risk & Ins. 405, 409 (1996); Harold H. Gardner et al., Disability Benefits When Workers Matter, 2 
Mind/Body Med. 138, 146 (1996); Denis Bolduc et al., Incentive Effects of Public Insurance Programs 
on the Occurrence and the Composition of Workplace Injuries, < http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/ 
publication/ 97s-24.pdf > 1 (accessed June 23, 2003); Fortin, supra n. 2, at 1-2. 
 4. Garder, supra n. 3, at 146; Harold H. Gardner & Richard J. Butler, A Human Capital Perspective 
for Cumulative Trauma Disorders: Moral Hazard Effects in Disability Compensation Programs, in 
Beyond Biomechanics: Psychosocial Aspects of Musculoskeletal Disorders in Office Work 231-250 (S. 
D. Moon & S.L. Sauter eds., Taylor & Francis 1996). 
 5. Bernard Fortin et al., Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance? 
<http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/97s-24.pdf> 2 (accessed Apr. 10, 2003); Fortin, supra, n. 2, 
at 1-2. 
 6. Fortin, supra n. 5, at 1-2; Fortin, supra n. 2, at 1-2. 
 
 7. Robert S. Smith, Mostly on Monday: Is Workers' Compensation Covering Off-theJob Injuries?, 
in Benefits, Costs, and Cycles in Workers' Compensation 115-27 (Philip S. Borba & David Appel eds., 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990). 
 8. Fortin, supra n. 2, at 1-2; Bouldic, supra n. 3, at 1-2.   
 9. Mario Roy et. al., Équipes Semi-Autonomes de Travail. Recension D'écrits et Inventaire D'ex-
périences Québécoises IRSST, report B-052, 45 Canada (1998). 
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resentative of all the social partners and directed toward a consensus.10  
Drawbacks to this approach include vulnerability to group dynamics and 
conflict over dominance. Training and awareness efforts have been used as 
didactic material11 without a clear reduction in injuries such as low back 
pain.12  As Goguelin states “[t]o make risk known is in general a good 
thing, but insufficient.  We must try to understand why the consciousness 
of the risk is insufficient and evaluate how one can go further.”13  Govern-
ment interference through legislation has also been used to restrict injury 
coverage.  Each of these initiatives aims to encourage the cooperation 
needed among managers and workers and has proved successful in this 
sense in a number of organizations. 
Inevitably, effective and efficient management of health and safety 
must spring from an understanding of the dynamics governing the inter-
vening parties.  This paper makes use of non-cooperative game theory to 
identify conditions fostering cooperation between managers and workers as 
social partners in the workplace.   
METHODOLOGY:  GAME THEORY 
Non-cooperative game theory models situations in which individuals 
make decisions unilaterally without consulting other intervening parties.  
According to Riggs et al., the subject of game theory is situations where “a 
competitive environment presupposes intelligent opponents capable of 
exerting influence over our outcomes through their choice of action, while 
  
 10. Patrick Loisel et al., La clinique des maux de dos. Un modèle de prise en charge, en prévention 
de la chronicité, IRSST, report R-140, 37 Canada (1996); Louis Patry et. al., Participatory Ergonomics 
and Prevention of Low Back Pain, William S. Marras et al., The Ergonomics of Manual Work, 523-526 
(William S. Marras et al. eds., Taylor & Francis 1993); Ilkka Kuorinka et al., Participation in Work-
place Design With Reference to Low Back Pain: A Case for the Improvement of the Police Patrol Car, 
37 Ergonomics 1131, 1133 (1994); Veronique De Keyser, La démarche participative en sécurité, 33 
Bulletin de Psychologie 479, 489 (1980). 
 11. Ken L. Donajkowski, Back Injury: Causes, Prevention, Treatment Prof. Safety, September, 21-
26 (1993). 
 12. John D. Benson, Control of Low Back Pain: Using Ergonomic Task Redesign Techniques, 32 
Prof. Safety 21, 22 (1987); Steven A. Lavender & Ron Kenyeri, Lifting Belts: A Psychophysical Analy-
sis, 38 Ergonomics 1723, 1723 (1995); Stover Snook et al., The Design of Manual Handling Tasks, 21 
Ergonomics 963, 1197 (1978); Peter Mandell et al., Low Back Pain 219 (Slack Inc. 1989); Ilkka 
Kuorinka et al., Manual Handling in Warehouses: The Illusion of Correct Working Postures, 37 
Ergonomics 655, 660 (1994); Monique Lortie et al., Analyse des Accidents Associés au Travail de 
Mmanutentionnaires sur les Quais dans le Secteur Transport, 59 Le Travail Humain 180, 187 (1996). 
 
 13. Pierre Goguelin, Risque et Prise de Risque: Les Concepts, in La Prise de Risques dans le Tra-
vail 29 ( Pierre Goguelin & Xavier Cuny eds.  2001). 
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concurrently we choose a course of action that maximizes our returns with 
respect to the opponents’ anticipated activities.”14 
Much of the conceptual framework draws on work by mathematicians 
Von Newman and Nash in the 1940`s and early 1950`s.  On one hand, this 
model demonstrates that effective individual strategies or behaviors do not 
necessarily create a situation that is best for all.  On the other hand, given 
certain conditions, it confirms that cooperation can exist without formal 
agreement among the intervening parties. 
Game theory has been used to understand and organize both human 
and animal activity.  As a decision theory, it helps to explain possible stra-
tegic behaviors of individuals without defining the final tactics.  Many 
textbooks cover the topic and its application in varying fields.15 
MODEL:  SIMULTANEOUS GAME WITH PERFECT AND INCOMPLETE 
INFORMATION 
Workers and management seek to achieve their respective goals by 
choosing preferred actions based on inferences about steps that will be 
taken by the other party.  Expectations concerning such actions are based 
on these hypotheses: 
 
• Each player (decision-maker) possesses information on the rules and 
conditions of the game (social situation); 
• Players are rational (“he makes decisions consistently in pursuit of 
his own objectives”);16 
• Players seek to maximize the anticipated value of their own payoffs, 
that can be described by an utility function;  
• Players are intelligent (he “knows everything that we know about the 
game and he can make any inferences about the situation”).17 
 
Since Milgrom and Roberts18 have shown that theories based on perfect 
rationality and adaptability are successful in generating predictions about 
  
 14. James L. Riggs et al., Engineering Economics 564 (McGraw Hill 1986). 
 
 15. See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press 1988); Drew Fudenberg & 
Jean Tirole, Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 
Handbook of Industrial Organization vol. 1 (Elsevier Science Publishers 1989); David Kreps, Game 
Theory and Economic Modelling (Clarendon Press England 1990); Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nale-
buff, Thinking Strategically:  The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life (W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1991); Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory Analysis of Conflict 1-7 (Harvard U. Press 
1991). 
 16. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7. 
 17. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7. 
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organizations and their practices, the rationality hypothesis is appropriate, 
even essential, to the analysis of technical situations. 
However, the assumption that all individuals are perfectly rational and 
intelligent may never be satisfied in any real-life situations as claimed by 
Myerson.19  Conversely, a prevention program based on irrational behav-
iors will lead most likely to an ineffective situation.   
In this problem, management’s and workers’ motivations as well as the 
variables modulating their choice of actions are well known.  Management 
allocates resources in health and safety owing to legal obligation, as the 
result of an economic decision or awareness of problems.20  Workers will 
engage in health and safety consistent with their personal objectives and 
their perception of the risks present in their environment.21  Not to be over-
looked, however, are asymmetries of information concerning the health of 
workers and the risk taking decisions made by social partners.  The model 
must also deal with diagnostic uncertainties, the difficulty in assessing 
risks present in the workplace and determining what level of risk is toler-
able.  Workers and managers cannot know with preciseness and certainty 
the value each other has assigned to the different variables modulating 
their choice of actions, nor the commitment the other makes to health and 
safety.  In game theory, this type of interaction can be modeled by games 
with incomplete and imperfect information.22  In this paper, we use a game 
with perfect information (the players know the history of the decisions 
taken in the past).  It is a reasonable hypothesis so long as the tactical fac-
tors are not broached.  Pervasive asymmetries surrounding information 
relative to the effort directed at health and safety justify use of a simulta-
neous, rather than a Bayesian, game. 
  
 18. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management  Ch. 1-7 (Prentice 
Hall 1997). 
 19. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7. 
 20. Sylvie Nadeau, Outil d'analyse Multifactorielle Pour la Prévention des Maux de Dos 116, 118, 
147 (unpublished Ph.D thesis, École Polytechnique de Montréal, Département de Mathématiques et de 
Génie Industriel 2001) (on file at Natl. Lib. Canada). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7 (“at the first point in time when the players can begin to plan their 
moves in the game, some players already have private information about the game that other players do 
not know”). 
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In this paper, we use the strategic (or normal) form to represent the 
game.  Therefore,  
 




N is the set of players in the game 
i is the player 
Ci is the set of strategies available to player i 
ui is the expected utility payoff that player i would get in this game 
 
A strategy profile (C) is a combination of strategies that the players 
might choose 
 
C = Χi∈N Ci 
In our problem,  
 
N = 1, 2 = workers, managers 
C1 = C2 = improve efforts in health and safety, maintain efforts in 
health and safety as is 
 
 
Four outcomes are possible: 
 
C = (a1=improve, a2=improve), (improve, maintain), (maintain, main-
tain), (maintain, improve) 
 
Efforts in health and safety can be considered laborious, costly and not 
necessarily maximizing the individual utility payoff.  There may be situa-
tions in which any small private effort in improving health and safety 
yields immediate and tremendous returns.  But the optimization of effi-
ciency of health and safety measures depends on the synergy of actions 
taken by the social partners.  Consequently: 
• If workers and managers both improve their efforts in health and 
safety, their expected individual utility payoff will incur lower cost. 
• If both maintain their efforts in health and safety, expected individ-
ual utility payoff will prove costly. 
• If one partner improves its efforts in health and safety, which is a 
very costly individual decision, the other will benefit from these ef-
forts.  More precisely, if a health and safety program goes off-
course, or if workers claim it is ineffective, workers may benefit 
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from these efforts but they are very costly to management.  If work-
ers’ efforts go unrecognized or are not sustained by the firm, how-
ever, the individual payoff is costly to workers while managers 
benefit (through lower their insurance costs, for example).  The fol-
lowing utilities emerge: 
 
u1 (improve, improve) = u2 (improve, improve) = less costly situation 
u1 (improve, maintain) = u2 (maintain, improve) = very costly situation 
u1 (maintain, improve) = u2 (improve, maintain) = beneficial situation 
u1 (maintain, maintain) = u2 (maintain, maintain) = costly situation 
 
This game may be represented in a tabular form, as represented in Ta-
ble 1: 
Table 1 
Game in Tabular Form 
  MANAGERS 
  Improve Maintain 
Improve (less costly,  less costly) (very costly,   
benefic.) WORKERS 
Maintain (benefic., very costly) (costly, costly) 
 
DISCUSSION:  EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME 
We need to determine where the game leads the partners in terms of 
the possible outcomes.  In this game, we can identify a Nash equilibrium (a 
combination of strategies that neither player will regret after assessing the 
choices made by other players), precisely: 
 
ui(c*i, c*-i) ≥ ui (ci, c-*i), ∀ci ∈Ci 
 
This strategy seeks to maintain without change efforts in health and 
safety.  We can also identify a Pareto efficiency equilibrium (the outcome 
of a game is Pareto efficient if the outcome of a player cannot be improved 
without diminishing the outcome of others): 
 
the result c^ dominates the result c if: 
 
ui (c^) ≥ ui (c), ∀i and 
∃ j, uj (c^) > uj (c) 
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In our game, (improve, improve) is a Pareto efficiency equilibrium.  
 
The health and safety game is similar to the Prisoners’ Dilemma.23  
The equilibriums found provide a clear indication of how the intervening 
parties will interact in the real world.  In this game, rationally, the social 
partners ought to maintain the status quo in terms of efforts in health and 
safety (Nash equilibrium).  They ought to avoid the moderate decision, in 
terms of expected individual payoff, which is to improve efforts in health 
and safety (Pareto efficiency equilibrium).  Therefore, the rational individ-
ual strategies will lead to an outcome that is bad for all social partners.  In 
this type of problem, we can command effective and efficient co-operation 
between workers and managers so long as the time span of the game is 
unknown.  This has been demonstrated using genetic algorithms by Ax-
elrod24 and others.25  
Analysis of interactions among workers and managers in health and 
safety, using game theory, brings us to conclude that if cooperation can be 
established, it has good chances for survival.  There are two important fac-
tors in establishing such cooperation: 
 
1. Acting on the costs and benefits of initiatives in health and safety.  
Wilde,26 in his homeostasis theory, points us in this direction: 
 
• One should reduce the benefits of taking health and safety risks, 
which may be done by the use of appropriate legislation or intra-
firm politics; 
• One should reduce the cost of making efforts to improve health and 
safety, which may be done by modifying the insurance fees or by 
promoting the use of safety groups; 
• One should increase the benefits making efforts to improve health 
and safety, which is the object of different incentive measures and 
may be done by the use of appropriate training programs and certifi-
cations; 
• One should increase the cost of taking risks in health and safety, 
which is currently done by legislation. 
 
  
 23. R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions Ch. 5 (Wiley 1957). 
 24. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation Ch. 7 (Basic Books 1984). 
 25. Fudenberg, supra n. 15. 
 26. Gerald J. S. Wilde, Beyond the Concept of Risk Homeostasis: Suggestions for Research and 
Application Towards the Prevention of Accidents and Lifestyle-Related Disease,  18 Accident Analysis 
and Prevention 377, 401 (1986). 
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2. Changing the rules and conditions of interactions by establishing 
implicit and explicit contracts in health and safety prevention.  In previous 
results,27 we have proposed an ergonomics intervention approach leading 
to the establishment of common and objective information on the health 
and safety risk factors.  Making explicit contracts and accepting this infor-
mation binds the social partners and limits the strategic behaviors, increas-
ing the probability of success of the intervention in health and safety.  This 
implicit contract is one of the conditions under which co-operation will 
take place without any legal intervention in either the infinite or the indefi-
nite versions of the game.  
Our analysis indicates that a range of measures may be employed to 
encourage and facilitate co-operation which might not occur in their ab-
sence. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that incompatibility exists in the 
aims and strategies of the social partners with respect to health and safety.  
This situation can prove inefficient or unproductive for all.  Management 
of health and safety needs to consider the strategic behaviors practiced by 
intervening parties to introduce measures that are effective as well as effi-
cient. Both implicit and explicit contracts must be constructed to address 
dominant behavior and to facilitate co-operation on health and safety is-




 27. Nadeau, supra n. 20, at 116, 118, 147. 
